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A Diversity of New Work Organization. 
Human-Centered, Lean, and In-Between** 
 
Lean production, from Toyota, is said to be paradigmatic for future 
production organization in the auto industry. This article challenges 
that view. Case studies at auto plants in the U.S., Germany, and Sweden 
show a wide diversity of developing new work organization. Not only are 
there differences across countries, there are also substantial and 
persistent variations across firms and even individual plants. No single 
model of production is yet emerging from this diversity. Although there 
are common elements such as team and group work, just-in-time delivery, 
and "total quality management", the actual shape of new work organization 
depends on a variety of factors including industrial relations, training 
systems, and labor market conditions. 
"Lean production", von Toyota, wird als neues Paradigma für die 
Organisation der Arbeit in der Automobilindustrie betrachtet. Der 
vorliegende Artikel widerspricht dieser These. Ausgehend von Fallstudien 
in Automobilfirmen in den USA, der Bundesrepublik und Schweden wird die 
große Variationsbreite von neuen Arbeitsorganisationsformen gut gezeigt. 
Dabei gibt es sowohl Länderunterschiede als auch Unterschiede zwischen 
verschiedenen Firmen eines Landes und sogar verschiedene Lösungen in 
einzelnen Betrieben eines Unternehmens. Wenn es auch einige gemeinsame 
Elemente gibt, wie beispielsweise Gruppen- oder Teamarbeit, Just-in-time-
Zulieferung und "Total Quality Management", so gibt es dennoch keine 
Entwicklung hin zu einem einzigen Arbeitsorganisationsmodell. Die 
konkrete Form der Arbeitsorganisation hängt vielmehr von einer Vielzahl 
von Faktoren ab, unter denen das System der industriellen Beziehungen, 
der Berufsbildung und die Arbeitsmarktsituation besonders hervorzuheben 
sind. 
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Introduction 
In response to changing world markets, intensified competition, new 
technologies, and worker demands, managers everywhere are required to 
reorganize work in important and sometimes profound ways. Such 
innovation, part of larger processes of industrial restructuring and 
production reorganization, is one of the central features of the modern 
workplace. But the new processes and impacts of work reorganization can 
be interpreted in different ways. 
In one prominent contemporary view, Japanese firms have reinvented 
production and all others will have no choice but to follow. For Womack, 
Jones, and Roos (1990), for example, the Toyota production system is 
paradigmatic. "Lean production", based on innovations such as just-in-
time supply networks and shopfloor production teams, has proven its 
superiority and will now replace mass production and "change the world". 
Work will be (or at least should be) reorganized everywhere based on 
superior Japanese methods; the outcome, in time, should be cross-national 
convergence along with more interesting, challenging, team-based work as 
the superior techniques spread. 
Another view agrees that managers everywhere, in the auto industry but in 
other industries as well, are pushing new team systems of work 
organization on the Toyota model; but they are doing so to speed up and 
tighten control over their workforces, pushing toward an increasingly 
nightmarish outcome for shopfloor workers. Thus Parker and Slaughter 
(1988) also see potential convergence for new work organization, in this 
view around a more intense version of Taylorism that they call 
"management by stress". The saving grace in this view is that workers can 
and will rebel. Parker and Slaughter thus project a picture of converging 
managerial initiatives to promote oppressive new work organization such 
as the "team concept", accompanied by increasing shopfloor resistance and 
conflict. 
Our view is that both of these analyses, in spite of the substantial 
contributions of each, are flawed in their general orientations. The 
research we have done on the U.S., German, and Swedish auto industries 
(the paradigmatic industry both for Womack, Jones, and Roos and for 
Parker and Slaughter) shows that not only are there different roads to 
new work organization, but there are distinctly different outcomes as 
well. We see not convergence around a single model but considerable 
diversity; and this diversity is not only nationally based but is 
apparent in considerable variation of plant-level outcomes within each 
nation. This diversity, we believe, is not a transitory phenomenon but an 
enduring one, as new and distinct, contending models of production and 
work organization take root in contemporary processes of industrial 
restructuring. 
The driving forces for organizational change are similar across and 
within nations: changing world markets, intensified competition, the rise 
of successful Japanese production models, the spread of new 
microelectronic technologies, new worker demands for more interesting and 
varied work. But outcomes vary in different political, economic and 
social contexts. The mistake that analysts such as Krafcik (1988) and 
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) make is to downplay the importance of 
these contexts. We argue, by contrast, that the political, economic and 
social contexts are crucial in determining outcomes, both for the shape 
of new work organization and the accompanying prospects of "new 
industrial relations" (see also Jürgens, Malsch, and Dohse 1989; Dankbaar 
1990). We find no persuasive empirical grounds for the view that 
contemporary globalization means the dominance of and convergence around 
one model of production organization (see also BRIE 1991). On the 
contrary, we find significant cross-national variation, with distinct 
national patterns that are strongly influenced by the institutions of 
industrial relations, the role of organized labor, and national labor 
market characteristics. And not only do we find national patterns, we 
find as well considerable diversity within the national range of choice 
for particular plants, dependent on the local institutions, preferences, 
and politica l interactions of employers, unions, and governments.  
It is not true, of course, that all things are possible. Japanese lean 
producers have reached levels of productivity, product quality and 
flexibility of product offering that are forcing others to respond. 
Western managers, for good reason, are adopting many new Japanese 
techniques. Japanese firms, especially in the auto industry, have made a 
major contribution by developing and showing the possibilities of highly 
efficient new work organization. Womack, Jones, and Roos have provided an 
important service in analyzing and calling attention to the elements of 
one prominent Japanese firm's success. 
But convergence, we argue, will be limited by national and local 
institutions and circumstances; patterns of diversity in production and 
work organization will persist, even as successful Western producers 
reach Japanese levels of efficiency. 
Sources of Diversity 
Why do we find such cross-national, cross-firm, and intranational 
differences in contemporary work reorganization? The answer is because 
politics, industrial relations institutions, union and firm strategies, 
and labor market conditions all matter. This is a perspective that has 
informed much of the best recent work on industrial relations and new 
work organization (such as Sabel 1982; Katz, and Sabel 1985; Kochan, 
Katz, and McKersie 1986; Jürgens, Malsch, and Dohse 1989; Pontusson 1990; 
Locke 1990; Thelen 1991). It is a perspective that is worth reemphasizing 
as we enter a post-Fordist era in which the natural inclination for 
researchers and analysts may be to seek to define a sweeping new paradigm 
of "best practice". 
If one accepts the conclusion that contrasting political, economic, and 
social contexts lead to different shopfloor forms of organization, the 
next and more difficult step is to specify the particular factors leading 
to particular outcomes. In other words, how do we explain the 
differences? We need testable propositions that specify 
interrelationships and that can be applied broadly, across nations and 
industries. A full set of hypotheses is beyond the scope of this article; 
but the following are examples of propositions, suitable for wider 
testing, that are supported by the evidence presented here. 
1. Where unions are integrated in management decision-making processes 
through legal or bargained institutions of codetermination, unions in the 
current period of work reorganization develop proactive strategies to 
influence the shape of new organization. The result is negotiated 
solutions: new shopfloor organization takes shape in a bargaining process 
between labor and management. One can expect in these cases that while 
some aspects of lean production will be adopted for efficiency purposes, 
other human-centered concerns that are not part of the lean system (such 
as longer cycle times, more autonomy for work groups, and elected group 
leaders) will also be incorporated. This pattern can be seen in Sweden 
and Germany. 
2. Where unions have long established arm's-length relations with 
employers and no formal rights in management decision making, unions face 
a choice between collaboration and opposition but are unable to play a 
proactive role in the shape of new work organization (at least until the 
arm's-length relation is substantially changed). Management will push for 
implementation of its own team concepts (heavily influenced by 
Japanese/lean models). The transition to new work organization will be 
rocky as management encounters a patchwork pattern of acceptance and 
rejection within the workforce, as the U.S. experience indicates. 
3. The specific form and implementation of new work organization is 
linked not only to industrial relations but to other factors such as 
national and local labor market conditions. The drive to implement human-
centered forms of work organization is stronger in tight labor markets, 
where competition for labor is based not only on wages but on the quality 
of jobs. In loose, low-skilled labor markets, new forms of work 
organization are less necessary to attract labor, leaving room either for 
lower skilled, traditional work organization or for lean production.  
4. There is a link between labor-market incentives for work 
reorganization and the national (and local) vocational training system. 
If such a system produces high skills as a "public good", the spread of 
human-centered work organization based on high skills content becomes 
more probable. Contemporary Swedish and German experience provides 
evidence for this claim.  
These propositions emphasize both institutional and economic variables 
(see also Cole 1985, who identifies organized labor and labor market 
circumstances as key variables in determining the success of "small group 
activities"). Indeed we argue that both markets and established 
institutions are critical in determining the shape of new production and 
work organization in this period of major transition and restructuring. 
As evidence both for our general argument and specific hypotheses, we 
present summaries of our case studies of organizational innovation in the 
U.S., German and Swedish auto industries.  To provide focus for this 
presentation, we emphasize the path-breaking arrival, at auto plants of 
all three of these countries, of team and group forms of shopfloor 
organization, where the isolated, individual regimentation of traditional 
mass production once held sway. 
Japanese-style Teams and Homegrown Solutions in the U.S. 
The early groundwork for the coming of team organization in the U.S. auto 
industry was laid at GM in the 1970s: in widespread Quality of Working 
Life experiments and in GM efforts to introduce team organization at non-
union plants in the South (Katz 1985, pp. 73-104). Both initiatives 
represented efforts to resolve shopfloor worker discontent, improve 
labor-management relations (in an industry notorious for relations of 
"armed truce"), tap shopfloor workers' ideas and thereby improve 
workforce morale, productivity and product quality. But the big push came 
in the 1980s. The GM-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, California, known 
as NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.), proved that the 
introduction of Japanese-style teams was possible in an American setting, 
even with an established American workforce and union (the United Auto 
Workers). 
The plight of the U.S. auto industry in the wake of the 1978-79 oil shock 
and 1980-82 recession is well known (Altshuler et al. 1984; Quinn 1989). 
Market shares of Japanese firms rose rapidly while the sales of U.S. 
firms dropped, plants closed, and employment in the industry plunged. 
Japanese firms, it turned out, had developed enormous cost advantages 
(for cars of similar or superior quality) over U.S. firms, advantages 
which to a significant degree could be traced to innovations in 
production organization. It was in this context, as U.S. managers sought 
to imitate just-in-time, outsourcing and quality circle (among other) 
strategies, that they were suddenly presented, in 1984-85, with the 
successful "demonstration plant" NUMMI model. 
NUMMI is a Toyota-run plant from which GM has made a major effort to 
learn.  There are many aspects of NUMMI's success (just as there are for 
the Toyota production system from which NUMMI is derived), but a key 
ingredient is the thorough-going organization of the plant workforce into 
shopfloor production teams. At NUMMI, workers are organized into teams 
typically composed of four members and a team leader. Although jobs are 
enriched through the teams for workers where the technology is most 
advanced (as in the stamping plant), most workers, especially in final 
assembly, do repetitive, routine, and highly standardized work in short 
cycles (about one minute). They rotate jobs within the teams, include 
inspection and some minor repair and machine maintenance within the 
teams, and meet every two weeks for half an hour to discuss production 
problems and suggest improvements. Although the system has been referred 
to as "team Taylorism" (Wood 1986) and "management by stress" (Parker and 
Slaughter 1988), union election results from 1986 to 1990 favored the 
cooperation-oriented incumbent leadership. The local UAW, in fact, led by 
former union militants from the earlier GM plant at the same site, has 
been well integrated into a new system of consensual labor-management 
relations; workers received employment security in return for new 
functional flexibility and the elimination of most job classifications. 
But NUMMI is no workers' Nirvana: in 1991 elections, opposition 
candidates won several top local union positions. Even supporters of the 
(former) opposition, however, who criticize the constant pressure to work 
harder and faster, claim to prefer NUMMI to the highly adversarial, low 
morale, work-fragmented GM system in which most NUMMI employees formerly 
worked. In the year following those elections, the cooperative, 
integrated labor-management relationship has persisted. An accurate 
evaluation of NUMMI should therefore be two-sided: on the positive side, 
high productivity and product quality, employment security for the 
workforce, and work that on the whole is probably more satisfying and 
equally apportioned than before; on the negative side, very limited team 
autonomy (at least in production), short cycle times composed largely of 
repetitive tasks, and constant "no buffer" pressure on the workforce. 
But NUMMI, although it may be the model to which many managers aspire, is 
far from the whole story of new work organization in the U.S. auto 
industry. Big Three auto firm management has been notoriously slow and 
only occasionally successful at spreading the lessons of NUMMI. Katz, 
Kochan, and Keefe (1988), for example, found no positive correlation 
between team organization at U.S. auto plants and good performance (such 
as productivity). Managers have often avoided the risks of change, even 
when prime opportunities have presented themselves; and when they have 
initiated major team organization campaigns, they have often pursued 
counterproductive implementation strategies that have resulted in 
failure. 
At an assembly plant in Van Nuys, California, GM made a major effort to 
transfer the lessons o f NUMMI.  Management, however, pursued 
reorganization in a typically old-fashioned, heavy-handed way which 
polarized the workforce and undermined the possibility of new labor-
management trust and successful teamwork. The plant manager negotiated a 
local "team concept" agreement in 1986 with the cooperative wing of the 
local union leadership. But the agreement was rejected by the workforce; 
only after heavy pressure and threats of plant closing did the workers 
finally ratify on a later vote. Team organization on the NUMMI model was 
then implemented throughout the plant in 1987 in a polarized atmosphere; 
and management wasted the opportunity and support it did have by its own 
failure to live up to promises of a new and more humane management style. 
The experiment struggled gamely along, supported by many but undermined 
as well by others within the ranks of both management and workforce, 
until the announcement was finally made in 1991 that the plant was 
scheduled for permanent closing. 
In 1984, GM opened its Hamtramck flagship plant in Detroit to great 
fanfare about the revolutionary combination of new work organization 
(shopfloor teams, new human relations) and advanced assembly technology. 
Although all workers received some training in the new system and at 
least enough "organizational development" to raise their hopes, 
expectations were soon dashed when production pressure mounted in the 
early months. Managers reverted to their old ways, sacrificing new 
concepts such as job rotation, pay-for-knowledge, and substantial team 
participation in the push to produce. By 1989, a union opposition group 
was strong enough to ride the crest of disillusionment and anger into 
office. Hard negotiations followed, centered around union demands that 
management fulfill human-side promises of the new system; by 1990, 
prospects improved for a team system that included short cycle times and 
limited team autonomy on the one hand but job rotation, team meetings, 
and improved worker input and labor-management relations on the other 
hand. 
The variety of outcomes for innovation at GM plants remained wide 
throughout the 1980s and into the new decade. At plants in Lansing and 
Lordstown, for example, management and labor initiated wide-ranging 
"joint" cooperative processes that included grouping workers into teams. 
Although cycle time remained short and team autonomy limited, these new 
processes showed promise for shopfloor innovations such as job rotation 
and worker involvement while protecting traditional union bases of 
influence (such as seniority rights - in contrast to NUMMI). Workers at 
Lordstown called their teams "groups", to emphasize that this was not the 
Japanese or NUMMI team concept but rather a distinct and evolving 
"homegrown" solution to the need for new work organization and engaged 
labor-management relations. And at Saturn, labor and management 
collaborated from the start in the conceptual and physical building of a 
new plant, to establish yet another, more thorough-going model of 
distinctly American work reorganization and labor-management partnership. 
Diversity is even greater within the U.S. auto case when we consider 
Chrysler, Ford, and the Japanese transplants. At Chrysler, management has 
implemented "modern operating agreements", including team organization, 
at some plants but not at others (depending in part on workforce/union 
resistance). Ford had the best production results of the Big Three in the 
mid-to-late 1980s, but moved slowly in the introduction of teams (wisely 
seeking to avoid the problems associated with GM's often rushed 
implementation). And the Japanese transplants, except for the joint 
ventures, have stayed non-union and have implemented team organization 
throughout their plants, with positive results for productivity and 
product quality (Florida and Kenney 1991). 
In the U.S. auto industry, therefore, the most obvious fact concerning 
new work organization is the great diversity of plant-level outcomes. In 
spite of widespread initiatives on the part of management and a general 
willingness on the part of the national union and many local unions to 
cooperate, the overall picture for the Big Three is of a very rocky 
transition that has yet to yield consistently successful results. 
Traditional ways die hard, and innovation failure has probably been more 
widespread than innovation success. Milkman (1991) argues persuasively 
that the failure to move decisively toward a "new social contract" that 
would include appropriate work organization is rooted above all in 
management's bureaucratic inertia. U.S. auto industry management has on 
the whole failed to reform itself adequately for the tasks at hand, while 
the UAW, still a strong union but within a seriously declining labor 
movement, has so far shown a limited capacity to develop its own concepts 
and push management toward successful work reorganization. 
Of the three country cases we consider, however, the U.S. has moved the 
farthest toward Toyota-style lean production. 
The Coming of Group Work in the German Auto Industry 
In comparison to the U.S. case, the coming of new work organization, 
including the current move toward Gruppenarbeit (group work), has been 
slow, smooth and fairly regularized throughout the German auto industry. 
In response to economic recession, intensified competition and the export 
challenge of Japanese firms, German managers since the 1970s have moved 
to rationalize production. In so doing, they have introduced new 
technology and work organization that has included speed-up and 
deskilling for some production workers as well as "new production 
concepts" for others (Jürgens, Malsch, and Dohse 1989). The latter is 
especially associated with advanced technology and in many cases has 
meant a reintegration of tasks and a shift away from assembly-line 
fragmentation to more conceptual work such as machine monitoring (Kern 
and Schumann 1984; 1987). 
At the same time, building on the union/SPD campaign for the 
"humanization of work" in the 1970s, the German metalworkers union (IG 
Metall) since the early 1980s has developed and actively negotiated for 
its own concepts of group work (Muster 1988; Roth and Kohl 1988; Turner 
1991, pp. 111-17). In the auto industry, this union campaign accelerated 
after 1985 and has laid the basis for labor-management negotiation and 
the contemporary spread of group work at major assembly plants. In 
contrast to both the U.S. and Swedish cases, workers' interest 
representation (IG Metall and works councils) in the German auto industry 
has played a leading role in designing group work concepts and promoting 
their implementation.  
The core ideas of union-promoted group work were developed at IG Metall 
headquarters in Frankfurt in the early-to-mid 1980s. Building on past 
research and experiments from the humanization campaign, union 
representatives and researchers developed group work concepts in response 
to works council, local union and member complaints about the effects on 
the workforce of management's rationalization drive. In a back-and-forth 
dialogue between union and works councils of the major auto assembly 
plants, union thinking crystallized around 1986-87 in the following 12 
principles of group work:  (1) a broad assignment of varying tasks for 
the group (including long cycle times); (2) group competence and 
authority in decision making in such areas as job rotation, division of 
work, quality control, and training needs; (3) decentralization of the 
plant decision-making structure; (4) selection of production organization 
and technology suitable for group work (based on decentralized technology 
and production concepts); (5) equal pay for group members; (6) equal 
opportunity for all, including special training where necessary for the 
disabled and the socially disadvantaged, to participate in group work 
("group work as solidaristic work organization"); (7) support for the 
personal and occupational development of individuals and the group; (8) 
regular group meetings, at least one hour per week; (9) representation of 
group interests within the established plant system of interest 
representation; (10) voluntary participation in the groups; (11) pilot 
projects to test the functioning of group work before broader 
implementation; and (12) a joint steering committee at the firm level, 
with equal labor and management representation, to oversee and coordinate 
the implementation of group work and the activities of the groups. 
IG Metall argued that group work could serve management interests in 
cutting costs and raising productivity while at the same time raising 
skill levels and making work more interesting and "human". High skill 
levels in the German workforce, promoted by an extensive, national 
vocational education system already in place, would make possible the 
widespread introduction of skilled group work. By 1987, works councils at 
most of the West German auto assembly plants had adopted statements of 
policy endorsing group work, based on the twelve principles or something 
similar, and had entered into negotiations with management to establish 
pilot projects and prepare for broader implementation. Management, for 
the most part, disregarded works council suggestions on group work until 
around 1986, when NUMMI and other examples (such as the Austrian GM plant 
at Aspern) began to drive home the potential contribution of shopfloor 
teamwork. In a reverse situation to the U.S. case, managers just 
beginning to develop their own thinking found union group work concepts 
already on the bargaining table. As negotiations proceeded and pilot 
projects spread in the late 1980s, the actual shape of new group or team 
organization emerged from processes of compromise between the union's 
maximal position and developing employer notions (favoring a more NUMMI-
style approach with, for example, less autonomy for the groups). 
At VW, for example, substantial pilot projects were established at the 
Emden and Salzgitt er plants as well as at the VW subsidiary Audi.  In 
1988, the VW general works council at Wolfsburg endorsed group work as 
its vision of future work organization in the auto industry, a vision 
addressing both production needs (flexibility, productivity, a highly 
skilled workforce) and a union-backed democratic workplace culture 
(Riffel and Muster 1989). In 1989, negotiations with management began in 
earnest for the establishment of new pilot projects and the gradual 
spread of group work throughout the VW plants. Both works council and 
management faced problems in this effort, both in their relations with 
each other (and their contending, if in some ways overlapping, 
viewpoints) and in their attempts, especially by the works council, to 
elicit shopfloor support. 
But management, union and works council are all strong and well organized 
at VW. One can predict (and already see the outlines of) lengthy 
processes of negotiation accompanied by fairly smooth and gradual 
implementation of group work at the VW plants. The works council won't 
get all that it is asking for in the design of new work organization. But 
it does speak with a consistent and proactive voice, backed by formal 
rights (in the Works Constitution Act) to information, consultation and 
participation i n management decision making.  The works council will get 
some of what it seeks, including the preservation of its own important 
position at VW, and the path will be cleared for implementation. Group 
work, we predict, will be quite different at VW from teamwork at NUMMI or 
the other American plants considered above, and will include more "human-
centered" features such as longer cycle time and more group autonomy.  
One can see the outlines of such innovative work organization emerging at 
the new VW plant at Mosel in the eastern state of Saxony (Jürgens, 
Klinzing, and Turner 1991, pp. 23-29). 
Similar processes are underway at Ford and Opel in Germany. At Ford, for 
example, the works council countered management plans to strip labor from 
a new advanced technology installation (in the tool-and-die plant) with 
its own proposal for group work. After hard bargaining, management 
accepted the plan in 1987 and set up a group work experiment that became 
a model for the integration of computer room programming and shopfloor 
machine monitoring. And at Opel, the first German auto industry agreement 
for the firm-wide implementation of group work was signed in early 1991 
between management and the general works council.  Building on pilot 
projects that included 1,700 Opel workers, labor and management agreed to 
full implementation of group work by 1993 in all Opel plants. The design 
of the groups is based to a significant degree on IG Metall concepts, 
including 8-15 members at varying skill levels, considerable group 
autonomy in job design and the organization of assigned work, a major 
commitment to training within the groups, pay raises for all (three per 
cent on the average along with this agreement), elected group leaders, 
and group meetings for one hour per week. Opel management expects that 
the added costs of group work will be more than offset by the gains in 
productivity. And Mercedes Benz announced the implementation of 
negotiated group work for 10,000 workers in 1992, to expand to include 
half the workforce by 1995. 
In contrast to the U.S. case, processes and outcomes for group work 
appear fairly regularized throughout the German auto industry. The 
relatively narrow range of outcomes results above all from the IG 
Metall's coordinating role in the development and promotion of group work 
concepts and bargaining strategies. The works councils at most German 
auto assembly plants adopted the concepts and put them on the bargaining 
table around the same time. And everywhere in the auto industry, 
management is restricted in what it can do unilaterally given substantial 
works council codetermination rights. We can expect that the 1991 
agreement at Opel will be followed by similar agreements at VW and Ford, 
and that group work in the German auto industry will continue to be 
implemented in comparatively smooth processes based on negotiated labor-
management agreement.  
A Long History of Group Work in the Swedish Auto Industry 
As in Germany and the U.S., the current Swedish experience with work 
reorganization has a history that str etches back two decades or more.  
Until the 1970s, Swedish industrial relations were based largely on a 
broad agreement between the social partners; with the Saltsjöbaden 
agreement of 1938, unions and employers each recognized the other's 
legitimacy and agreed to strive for the peaceful settlement of industrial 
conflicts, with employers retaining the exclusive right to organize 
production at the workplace. Wage bargaining occurred at the central 
level, while a "hands-off" approach for government in industrial 
relations prevailed. The first attempts at fundamental work 
reorganization came from certain managers who adopted "social-technical 
system analysis" ideas in order to reduce high turnover and absenteeism 
rates.   
Organized labor, however, considered the early management approach too 
individualistic, preferring a more collective concept of industrial 
democracy. During the 1970s, unions thus engaged in a broad "legal 
offensive" which left Swedish industrial relations more extensively 
regulated by the early 1980s. Included in the new legislation was the law 
on codetermination, passed in 1976, which established union rights to 
information, consultation and participation in management decision making 
at the plant and firm levels. A central-level collective bargaining 
agreement in 1982, between LO (the blue-collar federation), TCO (white-
collar) and SAF (the employers' association), established a framework for 
the implementation of codetermination, which was then supplemented by 
specific union-employer agreements such as the one at Volvo in 1984. 
The union legal campaign brought the movement for new work organization 
to a slowdown by the late 1970s. Although the experiences of that first 
period did not spread, some of them, such as innovations at the Volvo 
Kalmar plant beginning in 1974, nonetheless set the pace for further 
developments. 
After a period of turmoil in industrial relations, brought on in part by 
the union legal offensive and the campaign for wage earner funds 
(interpreted by many as the end of the "Swedish model" of peaceful 
bargaining for structural change; Auer 1983), a new period of work 
reorganization began around the mid-1980s. 
The new drive for changes in work organization was again initiated by 
management. This time, however, the changes were founded less on 
humanization-of-work than on efficiency concerns, aimed at reforming a 
bureaucratic, centrally controlled organization. Although changes were 
now legitimized on efficiency grounds, they were not opposed by the 
unions. Labor's new approach was based in large part on the success of 
the legal offensive and the new union rights to full information and 
consultation on all shopfloor matters. The metalworkers' union (including 
the auto workers) began to develop labor strategies for organizational 
change, which by the mid-1980s led to proposals for "good work" which 
included group-work (Metalarbetareförbundet 1985). Union group work 
concepts paralleled the basic group work plans already developed by 
management, which had continued to discuss and implement changes even 
during the period of the legal offensive. Work groups were designed to 
execute regular production work in reorganized plants, based on ideas of 
product shops, flow groups and the general notion that "small is 
surveyable" (Agurén and Edgren 1980). Such planning aimed at creating 
highly integrated teams of production workers engaged in job rotation, 
enlargement and enrichment. Production groups of the Swedish kind, in 
addition to direct production work, take on extensive tasks such as 
maintenance of equipment and tools, material planning, "housekeeping" of 
the group area, distributing work assignments among the group members, 
and vacation planning. Usually a group leader is elected, and leadership 
can rotate among group members. Wage incentives (pay for knowledge of 
tasks within the group and performance pay based on group or plant 
performance) as well as flatter hierarchies accompany the new forms of 
work organization. 
A study conducted at ten plants of the Swedish car producer Volvo (Auer 
and Riegler 1990), as well as other research (Berggren 1991), shows the 
diversity of group work forms. At the new plant in Uddevalla, highly 
integrated teams each assembled a whole car; in other plants, however, a 
team may only be a group of workers executing specialized tasks under the 
control of a foreman selected by management. But in most plants there is 
a constant effort to push group work concepts further.  
Plant-level diversity in the Swedish auto industry is even greater if one 
takes into account the changes in work organization at the second Swedish 
car manufacturer, Saab. Although group work was introduced there as well, 
Saab never developed a broad strategy to diffuse the innovations as Volvo 
did. Some of the changes (as in engine production at Södertälje) have 
been discontinued; and the new assembly plant in Malmö never represented 
as clear a departure from the assembly line as Volvo's Uddevalla plant, 
built around the same time (Berggren 1991). When GM took over Saab in 
1990, management decided to close the new Malmö factory, believing both 
that capacity at the principal Saab site in Trollhättan was sufficient 
for the future and that car assembly in the new plant was too costly. 
Different companies, but also different plants within a company (which 
are usually run on a profit center basis and therefore have considerable 
autonomy concerning issues such as work organization) exhibit 
considerable diversity of implementation in forms of group work. It is 
astonishing, for example, that Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, pp. 101-2) 
put on the same level of "neocraftmanship" two very different Volvo 
plants, Uddevalla and Kalmar, when the latter is much closer to "lean 
production" than the former. 
Although at Kalmar a new assembly technique (carriers on magnetic tracks) 
was developed and the plant was divided into small workshops (group areas 
of 15-20 workers each), the factory did not represent a radical departure 
from the assembly-line principle. The carriers' pace was centrally set; 
and earlier possibilities of variation afforded by buffers and dock 
assembly (working at stationary platforms) were restricted by new 
requirements such as just-in-time parts delivery. 
Uddevalla, by contrast, started production fifteen years after Kalmar and 
afforded a radical departure from the assembly line. The entire car was 
assembled on a stationary platform by a work group of around ten members; 
without centrally controlled pacing, there was more autonomy for the 
groups and more scope to vary production speeds. For the first time, 
assembly work, typically low-skilled in auto assembly plants, was 
upgraded: workers had to complete sixteen months of training before 
becoming full- fledged assembly workers at Uddevalla.  
A close look at work organization in the Swedish auto industry thus shows 
very different forms even at plants considered innovative within the same 
firm. The form of implementation appears to depend on a variety of 
factors such as available skills in local labor markets. Restrictions or 
incentives for implementation, for example, are set by the availability 
of both skilled labor and alternative jobs in the area, with important 
effects on turnover rates. 
In comparison to the other countries in our study, the following national 
pattern of work reorganization in Sweden emerges. Changes are mainly 
management driven, with extensive diffusion channels (through the strong 
employer federation) to spread information and facilitate broader 
implementation of change. Management sees working groups as one element 
of a larger strategy of organizational change, to delegate responsibility 
for profits, costs and "total quality" as far down as the shopfloor 
level. 
The attitude of Swedish unions has changed over time from resistance to 
support for change, in part because codetermination rights were enacted 
in law. The metalworkers union in particular has in recent years 
developed proactive policies for work reorganization. Given high Swedish 
rates of unionization (90% or more) and broad union influence in the 
political economy, union work organization strategies provide an 
effective channel for the diffusion of group work. The union goal is the 
realization of principles of "good work", combining stable, well paid 
jobs with challenging, skills-developing assignments. 
Although goals are not the same on both sides, there is enough overlap 
between the designs of labor and management for a "modernization 
agreement" to have taken hold. A cooperative way of implementing change 
has developed which has contributed to the diffusion of experiences and 
new forms. 
Volvo's decision to close Uddevalla in 1993 and Kalmar in 1994 cuts the 
ground from under proponents of Swedish-style group work. But according 
to Volvo management, the decisions to close resulted not from weak 
performance but from overcapacity. It makes sense to close small final 
assembly plants (lacking body and paint shops and stamping plants) and 
consolidate production at the larger Torslanda plant and the Skövde 
engine plant, where group work innovations will continue. Just as we have 
seen the influence of industrial relations in the development of Swedish 
work organization, so industrial relations also played a role in recent 
decisions. The union understood the overcapacity problem and preferred 
closing the smaller plants to cuts in the large union stronghold at 
Torslanda. Managers and unionists alike are emphatic that the remaining 
plants will survive and thrive with variations of Swedish group work 
rather than lean production. 
Conclusion 
The overall picture that emerges from these national stories, based on 
empirical studies of the politics of new work organization at numerous 
auto plants, is one of rich diversity. The isolated work stations of 
traditional mass production are giving way everywhere to new forms of 
team or group-based work organization. But the politics and processes of 
change as well as the specific shape of the outcomes vary considerably 
within and across both nations and firms. Although plant-level variation 
is important within each national case, there do appear to be distinct 
national patterns for the processes and outcomes of contemporary work 
reorganization. 
In the U.S., we see the broadest diversity of plant-level outcomes. The 
drive toward team forms of organization is management led, inspired by a 
Japanese "team concept"; but management has often pushed its programs on 
reluctant and divided workforces and above all has failed to adequately 
reform itself, to play a less authoritarian, more cooperative, 
facilitative and inspirational role. The official union response has been 
to collaborate with management on new work organization, although at the 
plant level local union responses range from collaboration to opposition. 
The union has played only a minimal proactive role of its own, one that 
would promote an independent vision of the shape of new work 
organization. The overall pattern has been one that includes both 
widespread failure to reorganize successfully, especially at the dominant 
firm, GM, and a rocky transition toward Japanese-style team organization. 
The U.S. case provides evidence for the second hypothesis: that arm's-
length labor-management relations result in employer dominance of work 
reorganization and a very rocky transition toward variations of lean 
production. 
In Germany, progress toward group work in the auto industry has been 
slower and more deliberate. Here, the union has played a strong proactive 
role in developing and promoting its own concepts of new work 
organization. There has been a relatively narrow range of plant-level 
outcomes, marked by group work negotiations and pilot project 
implementation, although labor and management at Opel have signed a 
breakthrough agreement that calls for broad group work implementation. As 
employers have become more interested in team forms of organization since 
the mid-1980s, labor (through the works councils) and management have 
been negotiating the substance of group work, including some elements 
that could be considered "lean" and others that come from the union's 
"humanization" orientation. The German case provides evidence for the 
first and the fourth hypothesis: that institutions of codetermination 
facilitate proactive union strategies which result in negotiated work 
reorganization; and that extensive vocational training promotes human-
centered work organization. 
In Sweden, the overall move toward group work began early, in the 1970s, 
and has progressed through a variety of forms at various plants. The 
drive toward new work organization has for the most part been management 
led, as part of a drive to attract workers and reduce absenteeism and 
turnover in a full employment economy. Backed by new codetermination 
legislation and bargaining agreements, the union in recent years has 
moved toward its own engaged, proactive stance on group work, and has 
tipped the balance within management toward more autonomous, "human-
centered" forms of organization that are quite different from Japanese 
team concepts. There is in effect a "modernization agreement" between 
labor and management to promote both the introduction of advanced 
technology and new forms of group work designed to be both human-centered 
and efficient. The Swedish case therefore provides evidence for the 
first, the third and the fourth hypothesis: that institutions of 
codetermination facilitate proactive union strategies which result in 
negotiated work reorganization; and that tight labor markets and 
extensive vocational training promote human-centered work organization. 
Our hypotheses on work reorganization are not intended to be exhaustive 
but rather to illustrate the importance of industrial relations and labor 
market circumstances for variations in new work organization. Although 
the evidence is richly suggestive, we have not proven these hypotheses, 
which require further testing in other industries and industrial 
societies coping with the challenges of work reorganization. If valid, 
these claims should be widely applicable in Western Europe and North 
America, and not just in the automobile industry. 
The Japanese case, by contrast, is unique as an important driving force 
for change in other countries. Although analysis of work organization in 
Japan is beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless clear that 
firms such as Toyota display great strengths in productivity and product 
quality. But Toyota is not the only Japanese way; there is considerable 
diversity within Japan, even within the auto industry (between, for 
example, Toyota and Honda). In addition, there is mounting evidence that 
contemporary work organization in Japan is changing; several analysts 
have claimed that on the shopfloor, the lean model even at Toyota is 
beginning to loosen up in response to the demands of Japanese workers and 
the need to make factory work more attractive to young workforce entrants 
(Nomura 1992).  And Japanese work organization in all its varieties is 
very much a product of its own institutional, historical and labor market 
context. Enterprise unions grease the wheels of cooperative labor-
management relations and team-based work organization; and enterprise 
unionism itself is based in part on past union demands such as employment 
security and seniority-based rewards (Kenney and Florida 1988, pp.127-
29). 
In their seminal study of lean production, Womack, Jones, and Roos 
mention in passing that there may be many aspects of Japanese society 
that others will not want or need to adopt (1990, p. 9). One of these, 
which they do not mention and about which they say almost nothing in 
their book, may be Japanese industrial relations, in which the 
subordinate enterprise union functions in many cases as a virtual arm of 
management. This is in fact the biggest mistake that Womack, Jones, and 
Roos make: the failure to acknowledge that the Toyota production system 
which they laud was founded in part on the defeat of independent unionism 
in the 1950s, and that industrial relations is always an important part 
of the development of new work organization.  And other important factors 
influencing work organization are beyond the decision range of individual 
firms: labor laws, for example, that allow generous leaves of absence or 
reduce working time, making it necessary to put additional personnel on 
the books; and tenure and mobility patterns, which may result in high 
turnover rates and in any case leave their mark on productivity and cost. 
It is precisely for reasons such as these that production organization 
will continue to look different in different national and local settings. 
Although it is true that extraordinarily efficient Japanese production 
models are driving much change in work organization practices in other 
countries, it is wrong to judge others by how closely they approximate 
the ideal type of lean production. Because political, economic and social 
contexts matter so importantly, there will be enduring and substantial 
cross-national and sub-national variations in new work organization, as 
the evidence presented here on team and group work makes apparent. And 
there is no more apparent reason now than there has been in the past to 
assume that there is "one best way", that one way will in the long run 
necessarily prove far superior in productivity, product quality and 
worker satisfaction. Even at its high point of worldwide diffusion, 
Fordism had widely varying local forms of implementation, as comparative 
studies of factory organization have made apparent (Lutz 1977; Maurice, 
Sellier, and Sylvestre 1986). And in an interesting counterpoint to the 
image of inexorably spreading lean production, Ruth Milkman has shown 
that even most Japanese producers in the U.S. continue to use traditional 
methods and have chosen not to make use of innovative NUMMI-style ways of 
organizing their workforces (Milkman 1992). 
If it is true, as we argue, that there is not necessarily one best way, 
alternative models must nonetheless successfully compete. In this essay, 
we have juxtaposed Toyota's lean production, which we believe includes 
human downsides such as intensive work pace, high stress, long hours, 
short cycle times, limited worker independence and an absence of truly 
independent employee representation, against more human-centered German 
and Swedish group work.  But while Toyotism has emphatically proven 
itself in competitive terms, the same is not yet true for German or 
Swedish group work. We think it is too soon to evaluate the latter 
nascent efforts and other current attempts at synthesis; but we do 
acknowledge, as do the relevant practitioners from both management and 
labor, that Japanese levels of productivity must be approached if German 
or Swedish group work is to succeed. 
In this regard, the building of a new VW plant at Mosel (Saxony) in 
eastern Germany is an important case. Here, VW management aims to match 
Japanese levels of productivity by combining elements of lean production 
with union group work concepts, the terms of which are negotiated and 
overseen by an elected, union-dominated works council (Jürgens, Klinzing, 
and Turner 1991, pp.23-29). Managers and unionists alike are excited 
about the development of innovations that could be spread throughout 
Germany. 
The important point here is that while elements of lean production are 
arriving in Germany (and many other countries as well), new work 
organization looks different in many ways from Toyotism, especially in 
the emphasis on human-centered design. Elements of new work organization 
-- JIT, job rotation, skills training, elected group leaders, decision-
making capacities -- can in fact be developed and combined in different 
ways, resulting in more or less individual and group autonomy. 
Convergence theories were dominant in the social sciences in the 1950s 
and 1960s, spearheaded as they were by the "industrialism" perspective of 
Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers (1960). These theories captured part of 
the truth: that industrialized societies contain many common economic, 
political, social and organizational aspects. But the predictive power 
and credibility of these theories were soon swamped by persistently 
distinct structures of political economy, even within the ranks of the 
advanced industrial democracies (Dore 1973; Schmitter 1974; Wilensky 
1976; Zysman 1983). Even the dominant mass production paradigm for 
industrial organization always contained within it important cross-
national (and other) variations, which became increasingly important with 
new markets and technologies since the 1970s (Piore and Sabel 1984). 
Now, with the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, 
economic integration in Western Europe, and the contemporary dominance of 
free-market ideology, new convergence theory becomes tempting. But 
entrenched national institutions and particular market circumstances make 
national and local diversity as important now as ever. This is especially 
true for production organization, in spite of the obvious success of lean 
production and the current widespread interest of Western managers in 
Japanese forms of organization. Firms, it is true, that cannot respond to 
Japanese levels of productivity, quality and flexibility will decline or 
die out altogether. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here indicates 
that although Japanese practices such as the team concept are widely 
promoted by employers in North America and Europe, the specific shape of 
new work organization will be significantly determined by national and 
local institutions, circumstances and negotiations.   
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 We are not arguing that organizational transfer is impossible. 
NUMMI and other Japanese transplants have shown that transfer is indeed 
possible, especially when Japanese management is part of the transfer 
(Florida and Kennedy 1991). As a general rule, however, we argue that 
national and local contexts will shape distinctive national and local 
patterns. 
 Successful Japanese transplants in the U.S. make it clear that 
labor markets with abundant skills are not necessary for the success of 
Toyotism/lean production. 
 Although our case studies are of the auto industry, the hypotheses 
are of a general nature and should apply across a range of industries. We 
look here at the auto industry as one important test of our claims. 
 Case study research on NUMMI and the other U.S. auto plants 
mentioned below is based on intensive interviews conducted at each plant 
between 1987 and 1989 (see also Turner 1991, pp. 31-90). 
 For more on the introduction of teams at Van Nuys, see Mann 1987, 
pp. 219ff. and Turner 1991, pp. 62-70. For a comparison od NUMMI and Van 
Nuys, see Brown and Reich 1989. 
 In contrast to both the U.S. and Sweden, Germany has a dual system 
composed on the one hand of 16 major industrial unions, engaged in 
regional bargaining with centralized employer associations, and on the 
other hand a separate structure of legally mandated works councils, with 
information, consultation, and codetermination rights in the workplace. 
Although works councils are elected by the entire workforce, blue and 
white collar, at each workplace and have no formal relationship to 
unions, most works councilors are union members. The tight linkage 
between union and works council is especially pronounced in the auto 
industry. 
 Based on a summary translation of Muster and Wannöffel 1989, pp. 
39-54. See also Turner 1991, pp. 113-114. For an updated version and 
general discussion, see Hans-Böckler-Stiftung/IG Metall 1992. 
 Case study presentations of VW, Ford and Opel in Germany are based 
largely on interviews conducted at the plants in 1989-89. For more 
detail, see Turner 1991, pp. 117-148. 
 For more detail on the specific nature of these rights, see Turner 
1991, pp. 98-99. 
 Negotiations for group work at Wolfsburg have recently taken a back 
seat to other issues (such as employment security, VW investment in 
eastern Germany and Czeckoslovakia, and the building of a cross-national 
Euro-works council at VW). Wolfsburg works councillors, nonetheless, are 
working closely with and watching carefully the more advanced efforts to 
build plant-wide group work both at VW-Salzgitter and at Mosel. 
 European Industrial Relations Review 210, July 1991, pp. 11-12; 
Betriebsvereinbarung Nr. 179: "Gruppenarbeit", Adam Opel AG and the Opel 
General Works Council, Rüsselsheim. 
 Economic recession and the continuing crisis of German unification, 
however, may well speed up processes of work reorganization. Just as VW 
looks at Mosel, so Opel looks at its innovative lean plant at Eisenach 
for clues about how to promote reform. 
 The material in this section is based on intensive interviews and 
other research at Swedish auto plants since the mid-1980s. For more 
detail, see Auer and Riegler 1990a and 1990b. 
 These ideas were developed by experts at the Tavistock Institute in 
Britain (Trist and Bamforth) and then elaborated by Scandinavian 
researchers such as Thorsrud (1972). Until the 1970s, Swedish industrial 
relations were based largely on the Saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938, in 
which employers and unions agreed to strive for the peaceful settlement 
of industrial conflicts and employers retained the exclusive right to 
organize production at the workplace. There was no German-style dual 
system and no codetermination until the 1970s. 
 For more on Kalmar and Uddevalla, see Auer and Riegler 1990a and 
1990b. 
 And at the new Honda plant in Tochigi, Siegfried Roth reports, a 
production system was introduced which for the first time did not include 
an assembly line and which was strongly influenced by the skilled worker 
orientation found in Germany and Scandinavia (Roth 1992, p. 19). 
 Womack, Jones, and Roos present detailed discussions of the 
relations and tensions between firms and suppliers and between firms and 
dealers, but unaccountably omit any substantive discussion of the 
relations and tensions between firms and their own employees and unions. 
This omission is all the more glering because the predecessor to this 
book, the first volume produced by the MIT International Motor Vehicle 
Program which they co-authored (Altshuler et al 1984), was quite explicit 
in according a primary importance to contrasting cross-national 
industrial relations. 
 A more useful conceptualization would be a continuum between the 
two, and the ideal version would probably contain a synthesis of lean and 
human elements. 
 
